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POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
WATER RESOURCES BETWEEN RECREATIONAL
AND MUNICIPAL USE
ROGER E. KASPERSON*

Recent research has extended substantially our understanding
of the ways by which private individuals manage a particular natural
resource. A concern with the degree of knowledge and accuracy of
perception by the resource manager and the significance of such
cognition for the decision-making process is a prominent attribute
of these studies.' At the same time, however, these research findings
dramatically illustrate the key role which the political system plays in
such questions in a modern, industrial state. Surely the specific issues
of resource allocation and management are derivatives of more
general problems of political economy.
Yet a corresponding thrust of research into the interactions
among individual resource users, governmental specialists, members of resource interest groups, local community leaders, and the
general public has not been forthcoming. Despite the small but
effective group of political scientists and geographers who have
devoted attention to the issues involved in public planning and
policy-making processes, Maynard Hufschmidt notes that
In recent years ... the water resources field has not attracted many
political scientists. Many, for example, have become interested in

urban and metropolitan problems and, of course, a bit earlier, the
field of overseas development and attracted many adherents from
political science. Still, when one considers the extreme public orientation of water resources and the many fascinating issues and questions
related to public administration and political behavior that are involved in water resources, it is difficult to explain why more political
scientists have not become interested in the field, and why more
* Assistant Professor of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, Mass. 01610.
1. See for example, R. Kates, Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management (Univ. of Chicago, Dep't of Geography Research Paper No. 78, 1962) ; Roder,
Attitude and Kno'wledge on the Topeka Flood Plain, in Papers on Flood Problems 11
(Univ. of Chicago, Dep't of Geography Research Paper No. 70, G. White ed. 1960) ;
Lucas, Wilderness Perception and Use: The Example of the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area, 3 Natural Resources J. 394 (1964) ; Burton and R. Kates, The Perception of Natural Hazards in Resource Management, 3 Natural Resources J. 412 (1964) ; T. Saarinen, Perception of Drought among Great Plains Farmers (Univ. of Chicago, Dep't of
Geography Research Paper No. 106, 1966).
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attention is not paid to the field of water rsources in political science
2
departments throughout the country.

A survey of the literature indicates that most substantial efforts deal
with problems of governmental organiaztion and administration.'
Similarly, despite the "high degree of significance for future work
in political geography," ' 4 there has been a nearly total neglect of
this uniquely suited sub-field of geography. An important gap remains, therefore, in our understanding of the behavior of the
various actors in the political economy of natural resource management and the significance of such behavior for planning and policy
formulation.
By examination of one local political conflict over both the spatial
and functional allocation of water resources, this exploratory study
seeks (1) to present some initial findings on characteristics of attitudes and political behavior in a water resource dispute, and (2)
to identify a number of larger issues in the public management of
natural resources. Four major components of the decision-making
process-awareness and knowledge of the disputed resource, attitudes to the political system, group organization and strategy, and
policy-formulation and political participation-are included in the
following analysis. First, however, some background to the dispute
is necessary.
I
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
A.

The Study Area

Located in southeastern Massachusetts, the study area includes
the city of Brockton, with a population of 80,000 in 1965, and the
smaller adjacent communities of Whitman, East Bridgewater, Hanson, Pembroke, Halifax, and Kingston (Figure 1). Brockton, formerly supported by its shoe and textile industries, is now experienc2. Maynard Hufschmidt, The Role of Universities in Water Resource Education:
The Social Sciences. (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Universities Council
on Water Resources, Madison, Wisconsin, July 25, 1966).
3. The following are representative: C. McKinley, Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest (1952) ; P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (1949) ; A. Maass, Muddy Waters
(1951); W. Leuchtenburg, Flood Control Politics (1953) ; P. Foss, Politics and Grass
(1960)
D. Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona (1963) ; R. Martin, Water for
New York (1960) ; R. Martin et al., River Basin Administration and the Delaware
(1960); Organization and Methodology of River Basin Planning (C. Kindsvater ed.
1964).
4. National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, The Science of
Geography 38 (1965).
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Figure 1.
THE BROCKTON-SILVER LAKE AREA.
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ing both an economic and population resurgence. Acting as the central city for the surrounding towns, it faces the common urban
problems of population growth and internal blight. The smaller
communities to the east, by contrast, retain a predominantly rural
atmosphere. A number of lakes and streams in the region known as
the Silver Lake area provide the single most important economic
base, and the town populations (largely in the 5,000-10,000 range)
double during the summer months.
B.

Data Sources
A number of sources provided the data for the study. During

the height of the water crisis in 1963, 57 resource users were interviewed in the Silver Lake area. The distribution of the interviews,
which was selected by a random cluster sample, is shown in Figure
2.5 Because the general lack of knowledge of resource questions and
political issues among the public-at-large is a common feature of
other studies and since political officials and resource users were the
main political actors in this dispute, the data collection effort concentrated on the more highly motivated and politically active segment of the population.
5. The map does not show the exact location of each interviewee but rather the
total within the cluster by means of equidistant spacing.
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Figure 2.
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEW SAMPLE.
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Depth interviews with community political leaders were a second
source of information. These open-end interviews concentrated on
the views of the community as perceived by the political official,
usually the chairman of the Board of Selectmen, and the political
activities undertaken by the respective towns in the Silver Lake
area. In addition, leaders of several water resource interest groups
provided useful interview results. In Brockton, although the mayor
and city water commissioner were the key figures interviewed, information gathered during field work also will permit some surface
impressions of political attitudes and behavior in the city of Brockton.
A collection of editorials and newspaper accounts of the controversy in the Brockton Daily Enterprise and the Silver Lake News,
the only local newspaper in each respective area, constituted a third
source of data. Content analysis permitted an evaluation of the
impact of this segment of the information system upon political
attitudes and behavior. Finally, other sources include interviews
with the firm of Camp, Dresser & McKee, the consultants to Brockton; interviews with representatives of the cranberry industry; correspondence with members of governmental agencies (e.g., the
Massachusetts Water Resource Commission, the State Public
Health Department) ; and the various reports, historical literature,
and legislative documents pertaining to the dispute.
C.

The Brockton Water Supply Problem

As in many other areas of the United States, rapid population
growth and the increasing per-capita consumption of water in
Brockton have severely strained its municipal water supply. During
the 1950's, experts from consulting engineering firms and state
agencies warned city leaders of impending water shortages. With
the severe drought of 1908-1911 in the hazy and all-but-forgotten
past, however, Brockton residents and politicians-who were enjoying an unusually rainy period-chalked up these dire forecasts
to the inevitable propensity of technical experts to project future
crisis. After all, the city had always solved its past water supply
problems with ease.
Constructed in 1880, Avon Reservoir, with its safe yield of 1.5
million gallons per day (MGD), was the original municipal supply.6
6. The best history of Brockton's water supply system is the unpublished report
prepared by Camp, Dresser, and McKee for the City of Brockton: Board of Water
Commissioners, Report on Water Works Improvement for the City of Brockton (November 2,1951).
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Then, in 1897 population growth led the city Board of Water
Commissioners to recommend the acquisition of Silver Lake, located within the political limits of nearby towns (Figure 1). Because the acquisition bill did not prohibit recreation and because the
population of the towns was small, the bill passed without opposition. Only six years later the State Board of Health intervened to
prohibit all future bathing, boating, fishing, and ice-cutting, and the
local populace felt the sting of their ready consent.
By the early 1950's, the stage was set for a possible crisis over
water supply. At that time, the Brockton Water District served the
city of Brockton; the towns of Whitman, East Bridgewater, Pembroke, Halifax, and a portion of Hanson; and the village of South
Easton. The rights of the Silver Lake area towns to draw their
water from the Brockton District was the price the city had to pay
for tapping Silver Lake. In 1950, when Brockton's average water
consumption reached 4.8 MGD, the Board of Water Commissioners hired a reputable Boston engineering firm (Camp, Dresser &
McKee) to prepare a thorough evaluation of Brockton's water
supply and to make recommendations for future planning. This report formed the basis for Brockton's attempts to augment its water
supply over the next fifteen years.
D.

The Camp, Dresser & McKee Report (1951)

Three major areas of evaluation-population growth and water
consumption, existing sources of supply, and alternative sources for
additional supply-formed the basis for the report's recommendations. At the outset, the firm made population and water consumption estimates for the Brockton Water District (Table 1). By the
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED POPULATION AND WATER CONSUMPTION
FOR THE BROCKTON WATER DISTRICT FOR THE YEAR 2000

Water Consumption
Total District
Per-Capita
Total Average
Brockton Towns
2000
Consumption (in GD) Consumption in (MGD)
7.3
90
81,000
28,000
63,000
Minimum
11.2
90
125,000
35,000
90,000
Maximum
Source: City of Brockton, Board of Water Commissioners, Report on Water Works
Improvement for the City of Brockton 8 (Nov. 2,1951).
Population

use of a questionable assumption-that the population rates between Brockton and the surrounding towns would remain constant
-it estimated the future populations of the towns of the Brockton
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Water District. The firm further estimated future per-capita water
consumption by simply assuming it would be somewhat higher than
an extension of the relatively constant rate of increase between
1900 and 1950. Based on these figures, the engineers predicted an
interim demand in 1975 of between 6.0 and 8.0 MGD.
Examination of Avon Reservoir, now unused except in emergency, led the engineers to conclude that its average safe yield was
only 1.5 MGD. Because of its limited supply and poor water quality, it would suffice only as a reserve supply until new water sources
could be obtained. Silver Lake had a safe yield estimated at 4.6
MGD, a figure then matched by consumption rates. In this manner
the consultants concluded that present sources were inadequate to
meet future demand, and additional supplies should be obtained.
The consultants considered three major additional sources of
supply. First, they considered existing ground water supplies but
determined these to be inadequate because of the magnitude of the
supply needed and because of the possibilities of iron and manganese content. Second, they weighed the possibility of a connection
with the distant Boston Metropolitan Water District but rejected
this alternative because of the higher costs involved in pumping,
connecting pipelines, and the higher water rates in the district.
Finally, like earlier studies, the firm decided the ponds and streams
(Furnace, Oldham, and Monponsett ponds and Howard and Pine
Brooks) in the southeastern portions of the state were the preferential source. The engineers estimated that these five sources would
produce a safe yield of 10.2 MGD, enough in their view to satisfy
Brockton Water District needs until the year 2000. At the time the
study was made, the consultants clearly envisioned only single purpose use (i.e., water supply) for the proposed sources.
II
CHRONOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL DISPUTE

A.

The Emergence of Crisis

In 1952, Brockton introduced legislation to augment its water
supply in the directions suggested by the Camp, Dresser & McKee
report. Determined opposition to the bill from the towns adjacent
to the proposed sources, the cranberry industry, and a number of
summer residents from elsewhere in the state, killed the bill in
committee. Unlike the political environment, however, the natural
environment was kind to Brockton in the years following this abortive legislative attempt. From 1953 to 1957 southeastern Massa-
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chusetts received fully twenty per cent more rainfall than the mean
for that area. Brockton's political leaders and water commissioners,
comforted by the brimming reservoir of Silver Lake, complacently
turned their attention to other local problems.
But unknown to the local administration, the favorable balance
they perceived in the water supply system was already threatened.
Brockton's population increased more rapidly, took more baths, installed more dishwashers, airconditioned more homes, and watered
more lawns than the engineers anticipated. While these consultants
did not foresee an average annual demand of 6-8 MGD until 1975,
by 1957 actual annual water consumption had already reached 5.4
MGD.
Alerting Brockton city leaders to the very grave situation developing, Camp, Dresser & McKee persuaded them in 1957 to
reintroduce the 1952 bill. The response was stunning. 1800 angry
people stormed into the public hearings in Boston to deliver their
protests, turning the meeting into an assembly of denunciation.
Although principally Silver Lake area residents, the dissidents came
from throughout the eastern portions of the state. Ranged against
them were only a handful of Brockton political officials, several representatives from governmental agencies, and the Camp, Dresser &
McKee consultants. With the political outcome apparent to all,
Brockton humbly withdrew the bill.
Nature remained patient. During the next five years, rainfall continued nearly twenty per cent above normal. Consumption, however, continued its unabated rise. By 1962, water consumption had
reached 7.8 MGD, an increase of more than fifty per cent in ten
years. At the tame time, the safe yield of the municipal supply
remained at about 5 MGD. The consumption drained Silver Lake
to about fifty per cent of its capacity. The consulting engineers renewed their warnings to Brockton officials, pointing out that in the
event of drought the Silver Lake supply would be exhausted in
eighteen months. Since the time needed to construct facilities for
water diversion of the proposed supplementary sources was also
estimated at eighteen months, the problem had, in their opinion,
reached crisis dimensions. Accordingly, they convinced city leaders
of the need for a new and vigorous legislative effort.
B.

The Legislative Effort of 1962-63
Determined to equip himself for the conflict he know would surround any proposed legislation, Mayor F. Milton McGrath of
Brockton asked Camp, Dresser & McKee to update their study of
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1951. He also knew that provisions would have to be written into
the bill to allay the fears of present water resource users in the
Silver Lake area. Obviously, only a well-prepared attempt stood
any chance of success.
The modified bill submitted to the Legislature in 1963 embodied
a number of revisions from the original 1952 version. It proposed
to divert only surplus overflows of water during the period from
October to May. All recreational rights and uses of the ponds for
flooding cranberry bogs would be fully protected:
.. . nothing in this act shall be construed as preventing the normal
use of the aforesaid Furnace, Oldham and Monponsett ponds or
Howard and Pine brooks for bathing, boating, fishing and other such
purposes, nor shall the provision of this act prevent the withdrawal
of sufficient water for flooding cranberry bogs. 7
The bill also established minimum water levels and flows and no
longer obligated the cranberry industry, as in 1952, to notify in
advance the State Board of Public Health of the time and amount
of water withdrawals. In short, the city finally broadened its
original single-purpose project to include both recreational and
supply uses.
Despite these legislative modifications, precedent proved to be
the attitudinal frame of reference. Scoffing at the guarantees in the
bill, Silver Lake area leaders characterized the legislation as simply
another in a series of threats and mobilized their forces for yet
another effective demonstration of powerful political opposition. In
a preliminary meeting held at a local school in the Silver Lake area,
over 1,000 people jammed the auditorium to express their disapproval. There followed, at the committee hearings in Boston, a
similar display of opposition to the bill. Brockton leaders salvaged
some hope though, when the House Committee on Water Supply
and Water Resources supported the formation of a special legislative commission to study their water problem.
C.

The Decision
Composed of representatives from Brockton and each of the
Silver Lake area towns; the state commissioners of agriculture,
natural resources, and public health; the director of the state water
resources commission; and a representative from the cranberry
industry; the study commission accomplished what Brockton could
not. The enforced consideration of the water problem by a mixed
7. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Bill No. 2969 (1963).
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study group of political leaders and governmental "experts" led to
a gradual erosion of political support for the Silver Lake area
opposition.
Several factors contributed to this shift in the balance of political
power. The steadily worsening state of Brockton's water supply
made some effective action mandatory. Also on August 1, 1963,
Governor Endicott Peabody intervened by calling for an investigation by the State Water Resources Commission of the water supply
situation in southeastern Massachusetts. He called attention to the
complication of the problem by "old water rights held by some of
the municipalities." ' In addition the flow of more accurate information to key political decision-makers contributed to the removal of
some of the emotional atmosphere surrounding the controversy.
The single most important element, however, was the realization
that society was not prepared to let a town go dry.
After a series of meetings and hearings during 1963 and early
1964, the special commission reported out a new water plan which
established a regional water district and authorized Brockton to
extend its water supply to the sources recommended in past legislation. The key concession in the report and in subsequent legislation
was Brockton's agreement to construct a filtration plant at Silver
Lake-a provision which insured recreational use of the new
sources. The bill was passed in 1964 and construction began the
same year.
This outward sequence of events provides little understanding,
however, of the processes of planning, policy formulation, and
decision-making. What were the prevailing levels of knowledge and
awareness among the various groups involved in the controversy?
How did they arrive at decisions as to the proposed legislation?
How did community political leaders and other interested parties
organize and what strategies did they employ to influence the
political decision? To answer these questions, it is necessary to return to the critical period following the introduction of the legislation in 1963 and attempt to reconstruct and analyze the patterns
of attitude formation and decision-making.
III
COGNITION OF THE RESOURCE

A.

Awareness and Knowledge
A very high proportion (58 per cent) of resource users in the

8. See the full report of the message in the Brockton Daily Enterprise, August 1,
1963.
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Silver Lake area listed water resources as a major community
problem in response to an open-end question. This was the result of
the crisis atmosphere of the time, a period when the Silver Lake
News was running banner headlines and featuring editorials on the
controversy. The high degree of knowledge among interviewees of
past diversion attempts by the city of Brockton (only 12 of 57
had no knowledge) corroborates the widespread concern over the
proposed legislation and emphasizes the importance of an unpleasant precedent to contemporary attitudes. Of the 12 who had
no knowledge of precedent, seven had lived in the area less than
one year.
Perhaps more surprising than the general high level of awareness
among interviewees was the widespread lack of information about
the resources themselves. Despite constant publicity, none of the
interviewees could name all three ponds and two brooks involved in
the dispute, and only 20 (35 per cent) could even name all three
ponds. In all cases, respondents listed the nearest pond first and
then perhaps one or two others-distance clearly influenced the
knowledge of sources.
Even more striking was the lack of accurate knowledge concerning ownership of the water sources. The fact that the diversion was
ultimately a state not a local question was, after all, a key factor
in the dispute. Without this consideration, there would not have
been a controversy in the first place. Nevertheless, only 49 per cent
of all respondents cited the state as the owners of the ponds, while
fully 42 per cent incorrectly cited the towns as owners. This misconception among a large minority of the more highly informed
segment of the population is of great salience since individuals with
this view would see no legal right to a proposed diversion by a
geographically distant community. Some analysis of this pattern
of knowledge is therefore in order.
Length of residence was particularly important in the degree
of knowledge. As Table 2 indicates, the level of knowledge of both
TABLE 2
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF RESOURCE

Knowledge of Water
Resources Involved

Years of
Residence

Knowledge of Ownership of Ponds

Medium
5

1.1-4.9

5

5

6

5.0-9.9

3

4

3

11

6

3

1.0 or less

10.0 or more

Town
7

Other or
Don't know
3

7

7

1

6

4

0

14

6

1

Low State
5
1

High
1

2

X = .16

2

X = .12
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the water sources (none or one lake = low; two lakes = medium;
three lakes or three lakes and one or more brooks = high) involved and the ownership of the ponds increases markedly with
increases in the length of residence. At the same time, however, onethird of the residents of over five years duration believed that the
towns owned the ponds. The explanation for this misconception
may well be in the character of statements used in the newspaper
and at public hearings. Content analysis of all references to ownership of the ponds in the Silver Lake News and the Brockton Daily
Enterprise during the months of January and February of 1963
(Table 3) shows an interesting contrast in the use of the possessive.
TABLE 3
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER RHETORIC:
USE OF THE POSSESSIVE IN REFERENCES TO DISPUTED SOURCES
(JANUARY 1-FEBRUARY 28, 1963)

Wording of Possessive
State's or "Great Ponds"
Region's
Town's
"Our"

Silver Lake News
0
1
8
2

Occurrences
Brockton Daily Enterprise
1
0
0
0

Despite the publisher's knowledge to the contrary clearly indicated
in an interview, news descriptions in the Silver Lake News inevitably lapsed into rhetoric implying local control over the water
sources. The Brockton Daily Enterprise, except for a lone instance,
avoided use of any possessive and usually only named the sources
in question.
In Brockton, residents apparently had little knowledge of or
concern with the waters in dispute. They had not been seriously
inconvenienced by the growing water shortage. Comforted by reassurances from city leaders, they took but desultory interest in the
confused debate over the enlargement of the municipal water supply.
B.

The Mythology of Alternatives
In many natural resource disputes, there is considerable con-

fusion among the public as to the choices available for a solution.
Frequently, the imagination of men creates paths which are so much
more inviting than those that exist in reality.' Consequently, in the
analysis of resource disputes it is possible to speak of the myth9. See the discussion of the influence of attitudes and myths on public apathy in the
New York water supply crisis in Sewell, The New York Water Crisis, Journal of
Geography 387 (1966).
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ology of alternatives. This mythology often provides the rationale
for a particular personal stance and covers the decision-making
process in a cloak of ambiguity.
In the Brockton controversy, the "giant underground river" was
the major myth among Silver Lake area residents. "The underground river starts in New Hampshire and flows in a curving path
through Massachusetts and then empties into the Atlantic Ocean.
When it reaches Brockton, it's about 3,000 feet down. The engineers are working on it right now. Where do you think the V.A.
hospital gets its water?"' Another interviewee's incredulous response reflects a similar viewpoint: "Brockton run out of water?
are you kidding? Brockton sits on top of one of the biggest underground lakes in the east. Engineers have proved it P"' Five resource
users and one political official cited, of their own volition, the
"underground river" as the best possible solution to the problem.
Efforts to determine the source of this myth were fruitless, although
interpersonal communication was apparently the means of diffusion
(there were no references to the myth in the mass media).
Those who harbored no illusions about underground rivers, often
entertained other mythical alternatives. Thirty-two (56 per cent)
of the interviewees believed that the crisis would be resolved by
Brockton's finding a satisfactory alternative source, while another
eleven ( 19 per cent) refused even to grant that the city would ever
run out of water. Several cited the claim by a local well-drilling firm
that ample ground water could be found if the effort were made.' 2
There was also a widespread belief that Brockton would eventually
succeed in tying into the Boston Metropolitan Water District. Still
others confounded the distributional deficiencies in the Brockton
water system with the need for new sources. Fewer than ten per
cent of Silver Lake area interviewees saw the sharply circumscribed
range of alternatives. As a result, the vigorous political opposition
was in great part the product of this hazy view of alternatives.
If confusion and mythology plagued cognition in the Silver Lake
area, apathy spread its blanket over the city of Brockton. Only those
in positions of public responsibility had any inkling of the nature
of the crisis or the alternatives available. Yet, even well-informed
individuals groped for that magical source which would bring the
millennium and extricate them from the ever-increasing difficulties.
10. Interview, Pembroke, Massachusetts, April 25, 1963.
11. Interview, Halifax, Massachusetts, May 5, 1963.
12. On March 19, 1963, the R. E. Chapman Company of Oakdale, Massachusetts,
touched off a furor by describing Brockton as "one of the greatest water-producing
areas for rock wells in New England." See the Brockton Daily Enterprise, March 20,
1963.

APRIL 1969]

ALLOCATION

OF WATER

RESOURCES

In a personal interview with the author, Mayor F. Milton McGrath
of Brockton speculated on the feasibility of using some bogs in back
of a friend's house as a source area to meet the growing water
shortage. He thought also of the prospect of diverting local brooks
to the bog, thereby using it as a storage area. In any event, he was
confident that Silver Lake would "come back" as it always had in
the past. 13
What in fact were the available water supply alternatives? According to the reports of the consulting engineers, the only "feasible" alternative was to divert surface water supplies in the Silver
Lake area. Yet, there was never a systematic search for and an
economic evaluation of all surface water supplies, nor were there,
until 1965, well-drilling tests to determine if adequate groundwater supplies could indeed be found. It can justly be said that the
range of alternatives was never clearly defined by any of the major
actors-the "experts," the political leaders, the water resource
users, or the general public.
Another major shortcoming in the definition of alternatives was
the failure of Brockton, its consultants, or governmental agencies
to recognize multiple use of the disputed water resources as an early
option. It was only under the pressure of political opposition that
the participants in the planning process finally considered multiple
water uses. The intransigence of the State Public Health Department to recreational uses of water supply reservoirs was, of course,
a contributing element.
C.

The PerceivedImpact.

The perceived impact of the proposed diversion contributed to
the characteristics of awareness and knowledge among resource
users. Only nine (16 per cent) interviewees felt that they would
TABLE 4
THE PERCEIVED PERSONAL IMPACT

Impact
Depreciate Property Values
Hurt Personal Business
Loss of Recreational Rights
No Effect

Numbers
19
1
35
9

Per Cent
32
2
59
15

not be directly affected personally by the proposed diversion. Most
(59 per cent) perceived the greatest threat to be to their recreational use of the ponds. Among these respondents, most were aware
13. Interview, Brockton, Massachusetts, May 18, 1966.
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that the proposed bill allegedly would not interfere with recreation,
but they discounted the guarantees as ineffective. Explaining this
position, they usually cited precedent for justification, saying that
they had been "burnt" before in Silver Lake and Big Sandy Pond.1 4
The "foot in the door" argument (Once Brockton obtained limited
use, further legislation could be introduced to restrict recreation)
became the rallying cry of Silver Lake area residents. The importance of precedent was continually present. Twenty-two (39 per
cent) of the water resource users and all the political officials interviewed in the Silver Lake area referred to it of their own volition.
All were quick to point out that in the cases of both Silver Lake and
Big Sandy Ponds, the State Department of Public Health eventually banned recreational uses. At a public hearing in January, 1963,
Worthen H. Taylor of the Department of Public Health admitted
to 800 Silver Lake area residents that in all but two of the 200
ponds used as direct water supply in Massachusetts bathing was
5
prohibited and permits were needed for boating and fishing.'
Most resource users also foresaw a devastating impact on their
communities generally (see Table 5). Interviewees perceived the
TABLE 5
THE PERCEIVED COMMUNITY IMPACT

Impact
Depreciate Property Values
Hurt Community Business
Decline in Summer Population
Loss of Recreational Rights
Don't Know
No Effect

Numbers
17
12
21
10
4
2

Per Cent
29
20
36
17
7
3

impact of the proposed diversion on the community in broader and
more varied terms. Comparison with the perceived personal impact
betrays a pronounced tendency to depersonalize and universalize
the impact. While the highly personal and material effects of lower
property values and the loss of recreational rights predominated in
the expected personal impact, the more general and abstract effects
of the economic decline and population reduction of the community
were critical in the expected community impact. Interesting in this
respect is the tendency of individuals to use identical expression and
phraseology in describing their fears. Of the twenty-one interviewees
citing the danger of losses in the summer population, nine described
14. Big Sandy Pond was requisitioned as a water supply for several nearby communities and recreation was prohibited.
15. Brockton Daily Enterprise, January 29, 1963.
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the bleak future of the community by an identical term-"ghost
town."
The interview data suggest, then, that the perceived impact of
the proposed diversion occupied two levels-the personal level,
where individuals viewed the change largely as a material threat;
and the community level, where they viewed the outcome chiefly in
immaterial and often symbolic terms. While only a knowledge of
the proposed change was necessary for the former, the latter
probably grew out of exposure to mass communications and participation in the social and political fabric of the community. Only the
latter factors can explain the tendency among interviewees to
express the reservation in precisely the same terms.
The impact of the proposed legislation was not, of course, limited
to the resource users immediately adjacent to the ponds. Real estate
agents claimed, for example, that even the threat of water diversion
resulted in fewer buyers for lakeside property. Local businessmen
feared a possible decline in their future sales. Cranberry industry
leaders, concerned that the proposed use of the ponds and brooks
for water supply would eventually lead to a prohibition of water
use for flooding cranberry bogs, added their denunciation of the
bill. A United Cranberry Company representative expressed the
views of the growers as follows: "If a foot is in the door, it's easier
to get into the house. They (Brockton political leaders) could
easily amend the bill so that it would curtail the use of cranberry
water, because the number of cranberry growers is relatively small
compared to real estate owners. Also, the State Board of Health
is rather dictatorial."' 6 Each of these participants in the dispute was
influenced in his attitude toward the larger political question and
motivated to political involvement by his occupation and position
in the community.
IV
PATTERNS OF POLITICAL COGNITION

A.

Awareness and Knowledge

Figure 3 shows the major parameters of the degree of awareness and knowledge of the political dimensions of the dispute among
resource users in the Silver Lake area. A surprisingly large number
(44 per cent) had actually seen the bill under consideration, and
only fifteen (26 per cent) thought themselves unfamiliar with its
provisions. Yet, in questions dealing with the content of the bill,
16. Interview with Mr. Brooks, United Cranberry Company, Hanson, Massachusetts,
May 15, 1963.
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KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL DIMENSIONS.
HAVE YOUSEEN THE BILL?

PERCEIVED

FAMILIARITY

KNOWLEDGE OF BILL'S

WITH BILL

PROVISIONS

I.

w
.4

C

w
I-

.4

STATUS OF BILL

KNOWLEDGE OF POSITION OF
LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS

.4

W

2~

~
0

Iw

.~*

2
n

>
0

~

KNOWLEDGE OF POSITION
OF STATE AGENCIES

-A
o

0

0
0

a.

9,

ww1
.a010
,.4w

A
l

=2
0

only fourteen (25 per cent) accurately described the restriction
of the diversion to overflow waters during the winter period. An
equally large number failed to realize that the bill did not provide
for interference with recreation rights. In addition, 29 (51 per cent)
could not cite correctly the current status of the bill. In short, individuals tended to overestimate their knowledge of the proposed legislation, and, despite their high degree of exposure to its provisions,
failed to assimilate the key restrictions included as safeguards.
Why was there this breakdown in the flow and absorption of in-
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formation? First, many individuals may have refused to consider
the guarantees of the bill, may have chosen to characterize the dispute in symbolic terms of a "struggle" between "us" and "them". In
other words, the lack of awareness may arise from an individual
lack of receptivity. 17 The sense of community is probably also critical in such a viewpoint. Second, the rhetoric of public communication may have served to cloud a more factual presentation of information. Table 6 presents telling evidence to support this hypothesis.
TABLE 6
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER RHETORIC: REFERENCES TO THE PROPOSED LEGIISLATION
(JANUARY I-FEBRUARY 28, 1963)

Category of Reference
Nouns
Bill, Proposal, or Plan
Implying arbitrary nature
("grab," "encroachment," "seizure")
Implying Uncertainty ("attempt")

Occurrences
Silver Lake News Brockton Daily Enterprise
24

28

6
3

0
0

7
2

13
6

6

0

2

0

3

4

Verbs

Implying unqualified control
("take," "acquire," "take over")
Qualified ("tap," "divert")
Adjectives
Implying arbitrary nature
("callous," "expedient," "vicious")
Implying precedence
("latest," "most recent")
Implying uncertainty
("proposed," "attempted")

The consistency with which the Silver Lake News cast the proposed
legislation as an arbitrary if not criminal action detracted immensely
from the guarantees in the bill. Characterizing the bill as a "grab,"
an "expedient" attempt, the "latest" of several such "seizures" undoubtedly contributed to the emotional and symbolical overtones of
the dispute. In addition, the failure of the Silver Lake News to
properly qualify the diversion in references to the water resources
(Table 7) (as did the Brockton Daily Enterprise) caused the diversion to appear as a far more serious threat. The lack of qualification
together with the systematic misrepresentation of ownership were
the seeds for widespread misconception.
The lack of knowledge concerning the position of public officials
was another source of misunderstanding. Despite the presence of
representatives from the State governmental agencies as backbone of Brockton's "expert" testimony, only eight individuals (14
17. K. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government 239-40 (1966).
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TABLE 7
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER RHETORIC: USE OF ADJECTIVES IN REFERENCES
DISPUTED WATER RESOURCES (JANUARY 1-FEBUARY 28, 1963)

TO

Occurrences
Sil'ver Lake News Brockton Daily Enterprise

Adjectives
Implying value

("precious," "priceless")
Implying beauty
("sparkling")
Qualifying

("excess," "overflow," "winter")

2

0

1

0

5

23

per cent) could correctly indicate the stand of officials on the proposed legislation. While such a lack of knowledge would surround
most similar resource questions, it is surprising here because many
(34 per cent) of the interviewees attended hearings at which these
"experts" presented testimony and others undoubtedly had read
lengthy resumes in the newspapers. This indicates either another
serious gap in the informational system associated with the dispute
or an unwillingness of the receiver to recognize or absorb adverse
viewpoints. Only when it came to the favorably-inclined local political representatives could the majority (75 per cent) of interviewees
accurately describe their position on the bill.
Given a situation of crisis dimensions, high exposure of issues to
the public, and a highly motivated segment of the general public,
the widespread lack of knowledge among individuals creates serious
problems for decision-making in a democratic society. Is there any
light in this generally dark portrait of political cognition? The
answer is yes. One positive element exists in the cognition of membership of resource interest groups. The Silver Lake area boasted
a series of local improvement groups oriented to each of the many
lakes and ponds of the region.18 Membership in one of these organizations implied a higher degree of knowledge of the proposed
legislation (Table 8). Granted, this may merely indicate the presTABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN A RESOURCE INTEREST GROUP AND KNOWLEDGE
OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Membership
in a Resource
Interest Group
Yes
No

Have You Actually
Seen Bill 2969?
Yes
No
15
8

x'=.02

11
23

How FamiliarAre You with Bill 2969?
Very
Slightly
Familiar Familiar Familiar Unfamiliar
2
0

16
8

6
11

2
12

x'=.03

18. These groups include the Oldham Lakeside Association, the Oldham Village
Improvement Association, the Furnace Beach Colony Association, the Monponsett Im-

provement Association, the Oldham Pines Improvement Association, the Monponsett Lake
Shores Improvement Association, and the Pembroke Resident's Association.
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ence in such organizations of the more informed and concerned portion of the population. On the other hand, political scientists have
long noted the informational and educational function of interest
groups. 19 Such groups may well be an extremely influential medium
for providing both legislators and the general public with detailed
and accurate information concerning natural resources. The impact
of resource interest groups is also apparent in differences in levels
of knowledge of pond ownership, a particularly troublesome and
confused issue in the dispute (Table 9). Efforts to improve the
TABLE 9
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN A RESOURCE INTEREST
GROUP AND KNOWLEDGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PONDS

Membership in a
Resource Interest Group
Yes
No
x, =.01

State
19
8

Ownership of Ponds
Town
Other or Don't Know
5
1
19
5

degree of knowledge and accuracy of cognition may find such interest groups a useful starting point.
B.

Attitudes Toward Government

Prior to field research, one hypothesis of the study was that a
sense of political alienation among the public would tend to create
apathy toward and a subsequent lack of knowledge of legislative
and political issues in the dispute. There is past evidence to support
such a hypothesis in a state noted for its political corruption and
party fragmentation. ° Yet, the interview results do not support
such an interpretation. To a question asking whether the community
had received fair treatment from the State in the past, thirty-six
interviewees (63 per cent) replied in the affirmative whereas only
six (9 per cent) indicated a definite negative reaction. An even
higher proportion-83 per cent-expressed confidence that the
state governmental agencies were a competent source of information.
Perhaps if the interviewees had been better informed of the support of these agencies for the proposed legislation they would have
responded quite differently I
Despite these favorable reactions to the role of agency representatives, the interviewees did not share this same confidence in the
19. The classic work is D. Truman, The Governmental Process 332 (1951).
20. See the discussion of the alienated Massachusetts voter in M. Levin, The Compleat Politician: Political Strategy in Massachusetts 149 (1962). For a criticism of
Levin's findings, see E. Litt, The Political Cultures of Massachusetts 177-80 (1966).
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state legislature. Thirty-two (56 per cent) believed it would make
a fair decision on the proposed legislation, but twenty-three (40
per cent) expressed doubt that it would. The reason most often
given for this doubt was that such questions were not decided on
their merits but on considerations of political "pull." If this does
indicate an undercurrent of political disillusionment, it apparently
did not greatly influence the public's political knowledge or mode
of political behavior.
V
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Since a continually well-informed and politically-active electorate
is as much a straw man as the economically rational man, 2' the assumption of this study is that individuals will participate actively
in natural resource disputes only episodically in a democracy.
These episodes should occur when the individual perceives a particular issue or event directly to affect him. The empirical evidence
gathered during the Brockton dispute may contribute to understanding why and how people get involved in natural resource disputes. Further, it is instructive to determine the role which various
actors played in the decision making process. In the dispute under
consideration, participation, organization and spatial linkages,
policy-making, and political strategy all contributed to the decision
on the proposed legislation.
A.

Participation

The most noteworthy aspect of participation in the Brockton
dispute was a geographical one. In the Silver Lake area, there was
a generally high degree of involvement and a ready willingness to
engage in political actions. Among water resource users, the entrance into politics was, of course, the more marked because of the
atmosphere of perceived crisis and the fear of personal loss which
permeated the dispute. In Brockton, however, where the population
faced
a genuine crisis of water shortage, the citizenry was apathetic.22 The explanation for this geographical difference in rate of
21. There is considerable evidence, drawn from a number of societies and accumulated over a considerable period of time, that a generally low level of political participation characterizes most democracies. "Politics and government are a peripheral rather
than a central concern in the lives of most cities in modern western societies." L. Milbrath, Political Participation 143 (1965). Similar findings are available in G. Almond
& S. Verba, The Civic Culture ch. 13 (1965).
22. Despite the fact that this generalization does not rest on interview results, there
is considerable supporting evidence. Not until the final confrontation in 1965 did any
interested citizens attend the various public hearings held in Boston and the Silver Lake
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participation has a broad significance for natural resource disputes.
To evaluate participation, it may be useful to recognize a typology, based upon motivation, of political participants in natural resource disputes.23 Private actors are those who participate because
they see themselves personally advantaged or disadvantaged by a
particular resource situation. Usually, this type of motivation involves the material well-being of the individual. In the dispute
under consideration, most political participants interviewed fell in
this class. Civic actors are those who, although not personally affected, participate because they see their community or their neighbors threatened. The perceived threats may be either material,
intangible, or even symbolic in form. The extent of involvement
depends heavily upon such factors as length of residence, membership in groups, and social cohesion. Past or latent political conflicts
may be important to the civic actors. Several Silver Lake area interviewees cited past intercommunity conflicts (Brockton's discontinuance of bus service, closure of a Brockton public market) as evidence of Brockton's lack of "good faith" in relations with the
smaller towns. Ideological actors participate chiefly because of an
intellectual or moral stance on conservation questions. This class
would include not only the politically-active rabid conservationists
but also those who act because of strong views on the role of government in the public economy.
This typology of political participants may aid in understanding
the vastly different levels of involvement in the two areas. In the
Silver Lake area, private actors were the majority, especially among
water resource users and the business interests. Fifty of 57 (88 per
cent) interviewees felt that they would be affected personally by
the proposed legislation. At the same time, the vigorous and opinionated coverage of the dispute in the local press and the pessimistic
forecasts of its outcome fostered a deep-seated civic concern over
the issue. Thus, both private and civic actors could be readily
mobilized into effective political opposition.
In Brockton, by contrast, people never really felt themselves
threatened. To be sure, the city periodically imposed water restrictions, but that is not unusual in Massachusetts communities. In
area. Analysis of letters to the editor in the Brockton Daily Enterprise shows a general
lack of interest. Moreover, this was the opinion of both the city political officials and
the local representatives to the state legislature.
23. A study of public opinion and collective behavior in the Delaware River basin
in Kansas supports this motivational typology. Especially detailed information on the
class of civic actors is available in these findings. See Warriner, Public Opinion and
Collective Action: Formation of a Watershed District, Administrative Science Quarterly 333 (1961).
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addition, many believed (perhaps rightly) that the State would not
allow anyone to go thirsty. As one resident expressed it, "We hold
the trump card, you see." The only actual shut-off of water occurred because of a distributional problem, and then only a small
segment of the population was affected. Consequently, the controversy did not generate a core of private actors, concerned over
possible personal damages.
A similar situation prevailed with regard to civic actors. Conflicting statements from city leaders over the need for augmenting
the municipal water supply resulted in a confused view of the gravity
of the situation and a lack of clarity in alternatives. And there is
evidence to suggest that a clarity of alternatives is especially important in mobilizing citizens who usually stand on the periphery of
politics. 24 Only a portion of the real estate and business interests,
concerned over the reluctance of several industrial firms to locate
in Brockton because of the uncertainty of water supply, developed
a clear civic concern in the latter stages of the dispute. The contrasts in motivational structures between the two areas produced
an almost diametrically opposed pattern of participation.
Some analysis of those who actually participated and the forms
of their participation may also be instructive. Among Silver Lake
area interviewees, the importance of membership in a resource interest group is again apparent (Table 10). Of course, these inTABLE 10
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN A RESOURCE
INTEREST GROUP AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Group

None

One

Two

tion

>Two

1

7

6

10

1

19

12

21

2

15

6

9

3

15

12

6

10

2

Yes
No

Types of Political Activity
Voluntary
Signed Wrote Attended work or
None petition letter hearing contribu-

Number of Political
Actions Taken

Membership
in a Resource
Interest

x

-=.01

x = .03

dividuals, to begin with, probably represent the more concerned and
active portion of the population. Yet, resource interest groups often
have strong leaders who are particularly forceful in urging members
to political activity. Once involved, individuals will probably persist
in combatting the proposal. The resource interest groups were particularly influential in making individuals aware of possible avenues
24. See Rokkan & Valen, The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data on Turnout,
Party membership and candidateRecruitment in Norway, 6 Acta Sociologica 111 (1962)
Campbell, The Passive Citizen, 6 Acta Sociologica 9 (1962).
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of action and in providing mechanism for political protest (e.g.,
names and addresses of congressmen, dates of and transportation
to public hearings). Group members are more likely to engage in
gladiatorial activities (i.e., those activities requiring a high personal commitment, such as voluntary work or soliciting funds) .25
A common generalization among state agency representatives
and professional consultants was that the Silver Lake area opposition was a product of "hysteria" and a general "lack of information and understanding." Kates suggests that the technical-scientific
community generally tends to ascribe the views of resource managers
which do not accord with their own to "ignorance," "cupidity," or
"irrationality. ' 2 6 Yet the data recorded in Table 11 do not support
TABLE 11
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEGREE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
AND LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESOURCE

Number of
Political
Actions taken
None
One
Two
> two

Knowledge of Resource
Medium
High
Low
6
5
6
4

9
4
2
0

2
3
8
8

X,=.01

Knowledge of O'wnership of Ponds
State
Other
2
7
8
9
x'=.05

16
5
6
4

this characterization of the local opposition. Clearly the more
politically active segment of the population was, at least in this
parameter of knowledge, also the better informed. This of course,
does not alter the fact that some individuals did take political actions based upon misconceptions and poor understanding. Yet, it
does fly in the face of the assertion of "experts" that the opposition
in the Silver Lake area was simply the result of misunderstanding,
lack of knowledge, or irrationality.
B.

Organizationand Spatial Linkages

Although the Silver Lake area had a large number of private
and civic actors available for political roles, meaningful use of their
motivation was heavily dependent upon both the manner and structure of political organization-the latter, in turn, closely related to
natural resource use. In most natural resource disputes, recreational
25. See the "hierarchy of political involvement," which classifies activities as "spectator," "transitional," or "gladiatorial," in Milbrath, Political Participation 18 (1965).
26. R. Kates, Fariations in Flood Hazard Perception: Implications for Rational
Flood-Plain Use, Spatial Organization of Land Uses: The Willamette Valley 97 (1964).
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users have usually lost. The numerous reasons for defeat include
difficulties in measuring and articulating the economic values of
recreation and in mobilization of effective opposition to conflicting
uses. Reliance upon ideological actors to present the case for recreation in public hearings and in debates with engineers, economists,
and governmental agency representatives has contributed to the
poor showing for this use. There are, however, influential political
advantages associated with recreational uses that are often overlooked.
In the Silver Lake area, recreationists were the dominant users
of the ponds involved in the proposed legislation. Little communities
had formed about these ponds and concern for maintaining property values and regulating both water quality and scenic attractiveness had led to the formation of improvement societies bearing
the names of the adjacent ponds. Thus by 1963, the area as a whole
had an infrastructure of resource interest groups which met periodically and which articulated concern over resource uses. These organizations, together with the local political officials, were the backbone for the Silver Lake opposition in the series of successful combats against the Brockton legislative efforts of 1953, 1957, and
1963-64. Convinced of the need for a more careful and systematic
organization to oppose future Brockton efforts, these groups in
1960 created the Mid-East Council for the Preservation of Water
Rights.
Described by President John Kroon as the "Minutemen of the
Silver Lake area," the Council served as the coordinating agency
for the mobilization of political opinion and activity. Composed of
two representatives from each of the various resource interest
groups, the Council met only once a year except when Brockton
sought special legislation. The Council formalized its watch-dog
function by appointing its first president as its representative to the
state legislature. It also capitalized on its spatial political linkages,
provided by summer residents living in other parts of the state, by
compiling a comprehensive list of these individuals and their permanent addresses. As President Kroon proudly noted, "We have
all the letters addressed and ready to go at a moment's notice.
We're well-prepared for Brockton." Figure 4 provides a sample of
one such letter.
Brockton, by contrast, had no such ready-made structure of
organizations to support its legislative efforts. Public water-supply
does not generate interest groups. Aside from the political officials
of the city, only the Chamber of Commerce showed any consistent
concern over the controversy. City leaders experienced great diffi-
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Figure 4.
REPRESENTATIVE CALL TO ARMS IN THE DISPUTE.

MID-EAST COUNCIL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF WATER RIGHTS
HALIFAX

-

HANSON

-

PEMBROKE

Oldham Lakeside Avsocbi"

Old m Village Imnprovement Aseeito
Furnac Beach Colony Asociation
Moipo
tt Improvement
Aa#oiatim
Finnish Tomperan,
Societal

Halifax Tapa=er. A.oiation
Oidham Pina Impronvamtn Assocation
Pine
Grove Association
M aU
Lake Shore. Improvemen A..ooatien
Reident'. AuAeiatien

January 14,1963

Dear Fellow Owner of Property
In Halifax - Hanson - Pembroke:
The City of Brookton again is attempting to take Rights
and Privileges on the uses of the Ponds and Areas away from
you*

The best way to proteot your Rights is to immediately
get in touch ijith your Local State Representabive, preferably
by a letter or by personal contact, stating your opposition
to House Bill NO. 2969, which no doubt, will be assigned to
the Water Supply Committee.
It is further suggested that you request your
Representative to insist that Hearings on this Bill be held
in the effected areas of Hanson, Pembroke or Halifax, so that
you will have an opportunity of letting the Legislative
Committee know your views.
Sincerely,

President

THIS BILL MUST BE DEFEATED
# H 2969

culty in mobilizing public opinion and activity. In addition, although
other communities in southeastern Massachusetts faced similar problems, Brockton officials did not cultivate their support. Even when
some contact was made, however, legislators were reluctant to give
political commitments because of potential reaction from Silver
Lake area summer residents. The Brockton situation imposed
formidable liabilities, and the confused pattern of policy-making
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and strategy adopted by city leaders markedly aggravated their
political position.
C.

Policy-Making: The ManagerialExperience

Is it possible to speak of policy-formulation in a community's
management of its natural resources? The very terminology suggests a degree of purposeful evaluation and action which, in the
case under consideration, never existed. Yet, the sequence of results
of public decisions cumulatively does constitute a policy, be it consistent or inconsistent. To gain understanding of the decision-making process, an evaluation of the goals and methods of the public
official is in order.
Shortly after he took office, Mayor F. Milton McGrath of
Brockton expressed amazement and deep concern when consultants
informed him of the gravity of the water supply situation. The
steadily worsening situation through 1962 incited city officials once
again to attempt legislation to acquire use of surface water sources
in the Silver Lake area. Concurrently, when the Silver Lake reservoir
was 33% inches below its normal level, the Mayor issued statements reassuring the public that the water supply was adequate,
that the lake had "always been able to come back in the past," and
that the only problem was one of "efficient distribution." This
complacent stance in the community, when juxtaposed with Brockton's predictions of crisis at State hearings, provided Silver Lake
area political leaders with potent ammunition.
As the crisis mounted during 1963 and the need for a consistent
water policy became more urgent, the conflicts and inconsistencies
in policy became more pronounced. On June 1, 1963, the city enacted
a ban on outdoor watering. By the end of the month, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health deemed the situation sufficiently grave to declare a state of emergency. But when a heavy
rain temporarily restored Avon Reservoir, the limited emergency
supply, to its normal level, city leaders lifted the ban on outdoor
watering for one hour per day. Daily water consumption immediately jumped from 8 mg to 10.49 mg. On August 21, in the face of
this heavy summer-time consumption, more rainfall and the completion of a new storage tank led city officials to entirely remove
the outdoor watering ban. A short eighteen days later, Silver Lake
reached its all-time low of 81 inches below normal. Unwillingness
to restore the water ban and the continuing heavy demand resulted
in the failure of Silver Lake to rebuild its supply during the fall
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and early winter of the year, and on December 3 1, the city started
using its emergency supply of Avon Reservoir.
An even more striking example of policy conflict and mismanagement occurred after the state had given Brockton diversion
rights to the additional water sources in the Silver Lake area. On
July 22, 1965, despite warnings from the consultants that the continued high water consumption would necessitate the installation of
an emergency water pump at Silver Lake, the Brockton Water
Commission voted 2-1 against a total ban on outside watering. By
the end of the summer, not only was a full ban necessary, but the
city also had to pass ordinances to put "teeth" into the ban. By
December of the same year, a special 8-inch pipe on pontoons had
to be extended 400 feet into the deeper part of Silver Lake and an
emergency pump installed on a raft to meet the supply problem.
These emergency arrangements ironically symbolize the failures of
water policy at the local level.
How can one explain the city officials' inconsistent policy which
endangered the public welfare, depleted the city supply, and furnished the political opposition with telling and effective evidence?
Two explanations are most prominent. First, city officials never
really understood the scope or ramifications of the dwindling supply
balance or the feasible alternatives for enlarging the supply despite
long discussions with and detailed memoranda from engineering
consultants and state water resource agencies. During the early
years of his administration, Mayor McGrath appears to have
genuinely confused the problems of supply and distribution. On
numerous occasions during the summer of 1962 he indicated that
once the city solved its distributional problem, its water supply
problem would be over. In addition, city leaders appear to have
made implicit assumptions of either cyclical or predictable patterns
(to both rainfall and water supply) which shaped their expectations of the future and dissipated their resolve to pursue tough and
consistent policies of water management. There were frequent references to the ability of Silver Lake "to always come back." A predictable pattern of water supply is assumed in the statement of
Brockton Water Commissioner Paul F. Kingman in 1963 that
"... heavy rains in the near future will help alleviate the condition (i.e., drought) but the traditional spring moisture has been
lacking this year. ' 27 The mayor's serious consideration of tapping
a local bog for water supply indicates his faith in some imminent
alternative.
27. Brockton Daily Enterprise, April 18, 1963.
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The second explanation of the inconsistent city policy follows
from the fact that a city mayor is not only a manager of community resources, but a political figure as well. The water supply policy
must be viewed in the broader context of the "economy" of political decisions and must be measured in terms of goals and the manipulation of the bases of political support. 8 The continued existence
of the city administration depended in large part on its ability to
deal effectively with the diverse and complex problems of a city of
80,000. Besides the water supply situation, city leaders during this
period faced difficult problems of educational expansion, sewage
disposal, and urban renewal. In early 1963 the Mayor announced
that he would run for reelection. Given his problems and objectives,
it was undoubtedly important that he demonstrate to the electorate
that he was satisfactorily solving the city's problems. Consequently,
he devoted much effort to reassuring Brockton voters, in part by a
relaxation of the unpopular and politically costly water ban whenever possible. The mayor also assured the population that an alternative water source would be found. Thus, when the local well-drilling firm of R. E. Chapman Company described Brockton as "one
of the greatest water-producing areas for rock wells in New England," the Mayor and Water Superintendent, instead of pointing
out the errors in this allegation, encouraged the belief that ground
water might be a feasible solution.
The conflicting statements of city leaders appear to have been
part of a general effort to allay public concern by purposefully not
presenting the city population with a clearer picture of the hazard.
The mayor justified this position by stating frankly at a state legislative hearing, "We could scare our people by telling them the
truth of our water problem, but we don't want hysteria. '

29

Is it any

wonder that low levels of knowledge and a general political apathy
prevailed in the city?
D.

PoliticalStrategy

The political strategies adopted by the two major parties in the
dispute influenced significantly the decision on the proposed legislation. Brockton leaders adopted what might be called a "faith in
science" strategy. This approach rested on the assumption that the
28. The significance of spatial political structure to decision-making in the city is
analyzed in Kasperson, Toward a Geography of Urban Politics: Chicago, a Case Study,
41 Economic Geography 95 (1965).
29. Silver Lake News, January 31, 1963.
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merits of the situation would determine the decision on the legislation. The major spokesmen for the Brockton case were, therefore,
the consulting engineers and representatives from governmental
agencies. City leaders did not attempt during the legislative efforts
of 1953, 1957, and 1963 to mobilize public opinion and participation in the Brockton metropolitan area. Given the managerial policy
of city leaders, however, any such attempts would have been difficult. The strategy was, in other words, essentially apolitical.
Silver Lake area leaders, by contrast, more accurately perceived
the controversy as a political question. The twofold strategy
adopted was predicated on this assessment. To begin with, utilizing
the organizational structure of resource interest groups, political
leaders effectively mobilized public opinion and participation. By
sheer weight of numbers, if not argument, they delayed public
hearings and committee meetings. In 1963, for example, 700 property owners converged on the hearing at the State House where
they outnumbered Brockton proponents 25-1. Second, community
leaders capitalized on the spatial linkages associated with the recreational use of water resources for the second prong of their political
attack. Pressure from summer residents in diverse parts of the
state provided a second line of defense should the proposal come
to a vote. The fact that the bill was never favorably reported to the
floor between 1953 and 1963 and that, in 1963, seven state senators and 46 representatives, representing 102 cities and towns,
appeared before the committee to express their disapproval suggests the efficacy of the strategy. Significantly, the Senate President
John E. Powers and House Democratic Whip Robert H. Quinn,
sniffing the direction of the political winds, both went down on
record as opposed to the bill.
In the final and successful legislative effort of 1964, Brockton reversed its tactics, finally learning from the example of Silver Lake
area leaders. Support arose in the city real estate and business interests who were concerned because of the decisions of several firms not
to locate in the Brockton area. The Brockton Taxpayers Association,
the Brockton Board of Realtors, the Retail Merchants Association,
the Brockton Area Chamber of Commerce, and the National Bank
of Plymouth County all donated buses to transport the public to the
hearings.3 0 The prevailing patterns of political apathy described
above remained unmoved, however, and city leaders could fill only
30. The role of the business interests conforms to the shifting and emphemeral role
of the entrepreneur in community power structure described so ably by R. A. Dahl, Who
Governs? (1961).
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two of the six buses. Silver Lake area leaders resorted to the same
strategy so successful in the past, but the water shortage had become
so severe and the erosion of support so extensive that the outcome
was reversed.
VI
THE LARGER ISSUES

The present study of the Brockton water supply dispute reflects
general issues in the public management of natural resources:
project feasibility and the public interest, the role of local attitudes
and participation, policy formulation and the planning process, and
information systems. Although others have considered these issues,
the Brockton controversy furnishes material for critical reexamination.
A.

ProjectFeasibility and the Public Interest

Criticism of economic efficiency, both from the standpoint of
underlying philosophy and measurement criteria, is widely available
in other sources." The Brockton dispute, justification for the proposed legislation illustrates two problems involved in the determination of project feasibility. First, the evaluation of benefits and
costs referred only to the area and population encompassed within
the political limits of Brockton. Since most resource development
projects take place in a politically fragmented space, interregional
repercussion can be an important component in feasibility evaluation. In the Brockton situation, possible adverse effects on recreational uses of the lakes and brooks were not included in the consultants early ranking of projects. An evaluation for the regional
economy might well have led Brockton to apply for inclusion in the
Boston metropolitan water district at an early date.
The second problem involves the ranking of projects by strictly
economic criteria. Since much of natural resource planning occurs
within a political economy, project evaluation should include explicit consideration of social and political values. In this dispute,
the allocation of waters between municipal and recreational uses
involved political questions over community taxable property, the
desirability of "home rule" management of water resources, and
the spatial allocation of public investment. In addition, when
the political environment sharply restricts either the range of alter31. See, for example, Measuring Benefits of Government Investments (R. Dorfman
ed. 1965) ; A. Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, in Water Research 311 (Kneese & Smith eds. 1966).
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natives or the ease of implementation among alternatives, planners
and public officials should show a willingness to adopt economically
less attractive alternatives. Maass suggests methods by which such
social and political values can be considered in benefit-cost analysis."
B.

Local Attitudes and Participation

A number of researchers have noted the need for a fuller understanding of the characteristics and formation of public attitudes. 3
Local attitudes and participation play a role of varying importance
in most public resource development projects. In the Brockton dispute, local attitudes and participation successfully altered the early
single-purpose use of the waters to include guarantees for recreation. In addition, they called into question the state of our present
knowledge concerning population projections, the health hazards
of swimming and boating in water supply reservoirs, and the process
by which possible supply alternatives are defined. Furthermore, findings point to the importance of precedent in attitude formation
and to the use of the myth of attractive alternatives. They also suggest that the mass media and interest groups may be critical vehicles
in developing both attitudes and information levels.
Evidence from the study points to the need for consistent policies
and a clarification of alternatives in water resource issues. Where
these dimensions are lacking, the public apathy and confusion so
widespread in Brockton may be the result. In addition, political
activity in the Silver Lake area indicates the cumulative and repetitive nature of participation, which in turn suggests that areas of
public choice need to be accurately set forth at the start. If alternatives evolve late in the planning process, as they did in the Brockton dispute, individuals may tend to react in earlier established
patterns.
Finally, interview results provide some clues to the motivational
structure and transmission vehicles of attitudes and participation.
People evidently get involved in natural resource issues for different
reasons (i.e., private, civic, and ideological), and a distinction
among them may be useful for enlarging the role of the public. The
positive effects of membership in water resource interest groups
upon levels of knowledge and activity also appear to be a potential
32. A. Maass, Muddy Waters 312-13 (1951).
33. Fox, Policy Problems in the Field of Water Resources, in Water Research 278
(Kneese & Smith eds. 1966) ; White, Formation and Role of Public Attitudes, in Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy 105 (Resources For the Future, Inc. ed.
1966).
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instrument in mobilizing greater interest and involvement in natural
resource questions.
C.

Policy Formulationand the PlanningProcess

Other authors have presented convincing arguments for public
control and governmental responsibility throughout the planning
process. 3 4 Yet the basic assumptions of public management of natural resources appear questionable. Public control and democratic
responsibility are possible only if the public is at least episodically
well-informed and politically active. In many natural resource conflicts, including the one under consideration, low levels of knowledge and participation relegate the responsibility for decision-making to the "experts" in governmental agencies and technical consulting firms. Some individuals involved in resource planning argue
that, given the constraints of public knowledge and concern, this
is a desirable situation.
Quite apart from the broader implications of such a position for
the democratic governmental process, the evidence from the present dispute scarcely encourages a high level of confidence in the
technical "expert." The reasons for this are threefold. (1) The
consulting engineers were consistently mistaken in their estimates
of both future water consumption and supply capabilities. While
they predicated as late as 1962 that the acquisition of the proposed
augmentary sources would provide for the increase in water consumption until the year 2000, in fact the drought of the 1960's resulted in an inadequate supply by 1966, only one year after the
legislation was passed. There is much irony in the fact that water
levels were so low in 1966 that water could not, according to the
legislation, be withdrawn from these new, additional supplies-and
this after a twelve year planning effort and legislative fightl In
other words, the degree of error in prediction was so high as to be
nearly useless as a basis for planning. (2) The universal unwillingness of these same technical experts and the representatives of government agencies to recognize the uncertainty which surrounded their
predictions and definition of alternatives. And perhaps still more
disturbing is their subsequent inability to make this uncertainty
explicit to the public. (3) Finally, planners do not faithfully mirror
the goals and aspirations of the public. They are a professinal group
34. The best of these is contained in the normative model developed by Arthur
Maass for the design of water development systems. See Maass, System Design and
the Political Process: A General Statement, in Design of Water Resource Systems 565
(1962).
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whose social and economic background, training, and outlook emphasize goals such as economic efficiency which are not the goals of
3 5
society as a whole.
What then should be the role of the planner, the political leader,
and the public in the public management of natural resources? 36
The public should establish broad social goals, make its views
known in specific political disputes, and provide information to
political leaders, planners, and agency representatives. Political
leaders should translate social goals into legislative objectives (i.e.,
formulate policy), provide information to public and planner alike,
and serve as a watchdog for the public over the behavior of governmental agencies. The planner or agency representative should
translate legislative objectives into specific projects (i.e., implement
policy) and provide information to the public and its political leaders. The information system, which must provide continual and accurate flows of information, and the participation of an informed
and concerned public are crucial to the success of the managerial
process. Yet, it is precisely these two variables which generally,
and specifically in this case study, malfunction in the management of
natural resources.
D.

The Information System

The Brockton water supply dispute highlights the need to improve the levels of information and knowledge prevailing among
the various participants in resource management. Concerning the
lack of water consumption-supply balance, Brockton's public officials
betrayed a lack of understanding which abetted a pattern of policyformulation already inconsistent and dangerous. Similarly, misconceptions among Silver Lake area inhabitants concerning the exact
provisions of the legislation and the ownership of the water resource
involved contribution to local opposition to the proposed legislation.
Brockton's population showed a serious lack of knowledge and concern throughout the controversy. Evidence from this study indicates
that the information system was inadequate and at least partly responsible for these shortcomings.
Figure 5 shows a rudimentary schematic diagram of the information system in the Brockton dispute which conceptualizes linkages
among the major participants. Information flows are divided into
35. See the discussion of the consequences of professionalism for decision-making in
Marshall, Politics and Efficiency in Water Development, in Water Research 303
(Kneese & Smith eds. 1966).
36. The following is an adaptation of Maass, supra note 34-.
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Figure 5.
INFORMATION SYSTEM IN THE BROCKTON WATER SUPPLY DISPUTE.
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continuous and irregular.3 7 The generation of information in the
communities stems chiefly from the statements of public officials
reported and editorialized in the local press. These sources were

a problem at the outset in both communities since Brockton leaders issued conflicting policy statements while the Silver Lake area
press, as content analysis bears out, confused issues by its emotional
37. The respondent's own judgment of the regularity of information flow formed
the basis for classification, although his evaluation was cross-checked by communication
and knowledge levels of particular issues.
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commitment. In the Silver Lake area, resource interest groups
transmitted information with considerable apparent success.
Major weaknesses are evident in the information system as a
whole. Particularly problematic are the absence of spatial (i.e.,
horizontal) linkages between the two conflicting areas-Brockton
and the Silver Lake communities. At one point early in the dispute
(1961), the Brockton Area Chamber of Commerce proposed a
radio forum to create better understanding on both sides but nothing
came of it. Only when facing one another as adversaries in public
hearing or, in later stages, as members of the study commission did
public leaders from the two areas come into contact. The consultants
who acted as major information transmittors rarely had any contact with representatives of the Silver Lake area. Outside their local
communities, Silver Lake area leaders were in close contact only
with the state legislature, and then chiefly to affect legislation.
If the present case at all typifies information systems in other
similar disputes, an obvious recommendation for improving the
managerial process is to improve the information systems. One
method would be for governmental agencies to include a staff member who would function as a liaison man. In this role, such an individual could educate local political officials and gather and disperse information to local political leaders, resource interest groups,
and the local press. This procedure would involve a more comprehensive view of planning than now generally prevails. Another improvement for the system would be the upgrading of the accuracy of
the local press. The suggested radio forum that bring adversaries
together might also prove a useful vehicle for defining areas of
compromise and for eliminating misconceptions. Finally, political
units and agencies, at all levels, might beneficially allocate more
funds for information-gathering than is usually now the case.

